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mmary 
this article I examine Frank Fisher’s “three stages of environmental 
ncern” and compare these with each of Charles S. Peirce’s “three grades of 
arness.” The aim of the article is to provide a framework within which 
pporters of the deep ecology movement will be better able to distinguish 
tween three progressively deeper levels of environmental concern: whistle-
wing; oppositional struggle (e.g., non-violent protesting); and deep ecology 
 enquiry. I argue that while each level of concern is necessary, it is only at 
 third grade of clearness, or stage of concern, that supporters of the deep 
ology movement can effectively construct and communicate an ongoing 
mmunity of deep enquiry for ecosophical living. 
r ability to create technologies has in recent times outstripped the 
rth’s capacity to provide an ecos or home for them.1 An emerging 
areness of the social and ecological dislocations caused by modern 
hnology has given rise to the deep ecology movement.2 The deep 
ology movement hopes to persuade the wider community toward 
cognition of environmental concern, and to take community-based 
tion that will remedy the environmental dislocations caused by 
odern technology.  
hat method should be used to achieve the above aim when many of 
r present methods of “fixing” environmental dislocations are in fact 
using them? For example, disruptions to natural systems often arise 
en our ways of thinking about nature, and therefore our ways of 
teracting with nature, become disconnected from the way nature 
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actually feels and behaves.3 If such disconnections go unrecognized, 
efforts directed toward reintegrating our technologies with nature will 
be misdirected. Indeed, such misguided remedial interventions can 
make the technology-nature disconnections we are concerned with 
worse.4 In short, our remedial efforts in relation to environmental 
dislocations are possibly being handicapped by “shallow” 
interpretations of what is really going wrong.  
To assist us in the task of dissolving environmental dislocations at their 
deepest level, Fisher5 has suggested that three progressively deeper 
levels, or “generations of awareness” can be identified: first, at the 
whistle-blowing level, we establish an awareness of environmental 
breakdown; next, we formulate and legitimize political or social 
insights into the causes of the environmental breakdown; and, finally, if 
action at both these former levels fails to resolve the harm, we enter a 
level of awareness in which we begin to critically examine the very 
ways of thinking and questioning we use to recognize and remedy 
environmental dislocations.  
According to Fisher, then, at the deepest level of environmental 
awareness, we investigate the very world views (values) that generate 
environmental breakdowns. We question our methods of reasoning, so 
these can be reasoned about, and modified. This enables us to dissolve 
the very conditions that give rise to environmental dislocations. In this 
sense, each of Fisher’s levels of concern represents a deeper and more 
developed interpretation of the ways of thinking and acting that cause 
environmental dislocations, and each deeper level therefore leads to a 
distinct style of remedial intervention.  
In this article, I want to critically examine Fisher’s three levels of 
environmental concern and link them conceptually to what the logician 
Charles S. Peirce has called his “three grades of clearness of thought.”6 
My aim is to show that it is not only possible to identify three distinct 
levels of environmental awareness, but also that these levels of concern 
can be related to three qualitatively different logical categories, which 
Peirce called respectively: the monadic grade of feeling, the dyadic 
grade of conduct, and the plural grade of thought.  
Why should the above task be of interest to supporters of the deep 
ecology movement? While Fisher has recognized three levels of 
progressively deeper awareness, he argues that each level of 
environmental awareness arises out of the failure of solutions attempted 
at the preceding level. Peirce, on the other hand, argues that the logical 
relations between his grades of clearness arise in a precisely contrary 
manner to that proposed by Fisher. In Peirce’s logical framework, the 
most adequate level presupposes the recognition of a lower grade, 
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making the first category of feeling the deepest level of concern. 
Further, for Peirce, all three grades of clearness are necessary for 
attaining an adequate approach to human-nature interaction. In other 
words, for Peirce, each grade of clearness presupposes the attainment 
of, rather than the failure of, the preceding grade of clearness, making 
the deepest level of awareness a direct (i.e., an experientially derived) 
recognition of environmental harm.  
I have undertaken the present task within a context of deep ecological 
thinking because it is through our interpretations of environmental harm 
that the need to maintain a socially mediated identification with nature 
arises.7 Thus, in order to correct the shared errors in thinking and acting 
that lead to harm, we must be able to return to the source of our 
assumptions, and revise them in the light of a direct experience with 
nature. As such, even our most deeply held spiritual assumptions are 
not held to be axiomatic. Rather, they too are evolving. If we are to 
evolve with nature, then, our thinking must be as free as the thinking of 
the beings with which we co-exist.  
Success in environmental communication, therefore, should be 
measured in terms of how well our method of enquiry links us to 
natural systems, especially to systems that we are unable to observe and 
interact with unless we discover a method for making such interactions 
possible. In other words, for Peirce, enquiry is an erotetic process: it 
comprises an interrogatory relation of both deep questioning and deep 
answering. At this level of concern, our interpretations of nature help us 
see what ought to be the meaning of these interpretations if their 
usefulness for resolving environmental dislocations is to be realized.  
The only system that can put remedial actions of the above kind to a 
test is the system that made the dislocation evident to us in the first 
place—nature. My overall purpose in this article, then, is to show how 
Fisher’s three stages of environmental concern can be linked to Peirce’s 
three logical categories to yield a recursive system for deep questioning. 
As such, a triadic system of environmental concern combines Naess’ 
concern for deep questioning with his concept of a “relational, total 
field” approach to environmental concern.8 Each stage (or grade) of 
questioning is necessary to the overall process of recognizing 
environmental dislocation, analyzing distinctly what it is that makes the 
dislocation problematic, and then working in a manner in which our 
thinking and actions are made adequate to the task of collaborating with 
nature. 
It is within the above general context that I will next investigate each 
level of the triadic system of environmental concern in detail. My 
argument, in line with both Fisher and Peirce, is that our interactions 
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with the environment should ideally attain the third grade, or level, of 
concern.  
1 Whistle-blowing 
Fisher calls the first stage of environmental concern whistle-blowing. 
This is also the realm of Peirce’s first grade of clearness, the grade in 
which simple qualities of feeling are prevalent. In this stage, something 
is experienced by a person and is called a problem. Initially, therefore, 
the environmentalist’s concern is purely an experience linked to a word 
or idea to which the experience familiarly applies. In the present 
context, the experience is familiar enough and clear enough to be 
recognized and linked to the term “environmental problem.”  
In the above sense, and as Douglas and Wildavsky9 have argued, 
environmental problems may at first appear to have been randomly 
selected. There are an infinite number of concerns the environmentalist 
might potentially choose from. I say “potentially” because whether or 
not the selected problem is an imaginary problem or a real problem is, 
at the whistle-blowing stage, a largely pointless question. This is 
because the subject matter of the environmentalist’s concern, at the 
whistle-blowing stage, has not been socially recognized. The whistle-
blower’s concern relates to a potential existence, and as such, it has no 
actual existence. In other words, the concern has not emerged as a 
social reality, because it has not yet been connected to anything we 
already know that would oppose it. For example, at an organizational 
level, we may find that there are no procedures to deal with the whistle-
blower’s concern, because, as yet, the problem does not exist, except in 
the experience of the whistle-blower, who feels the concern. 
The whistle-blower’s concern, then, in the first grade of clearness, is 
primarily hypothetical. Whistle-blowers want it understood that they 
know that something is wrong, and that their hypothesis potentially 
explains a surprising observation. Thus, even though the whistle-blower 
may have connected the problem experience to a set of events by 
researching the concern at an individual level, the concern cannot be 
recognized by others in this same sense—it has not been recognized at 
an organizational, or community level.  
Indeed, if the environmental whistle-blower overextends the patience of 
an employer or regulative organization at this first stage of concern, the 
environmentalist may be told that she or he is “imagining things.” This 
is perhaps why in a recent Australian survey of the public sector’s 
response to whistle-blowers, 22 per cent of the 72 whistle-blowers 
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surveyed said they were compulsorily referred, “to a psychiatrist, and in 
some cases to a psychologist, social worker or other professional.”10  
In sum, in the first stage of concern, the experienced concern is treated 
as a personal opinion lacking a shared community reference. If a 
community of enquiry does not form around the concern, the 
environmental dislocation that is the object of concern will continue 
uninterrupted, and the whistle-blower will be ignored, or perhaps even 
actively suppressed.11 
2 Struggle! 
In the next of Fisher’s stages of environmental concern, 
environmentalists begin to gain support for their claim by searching out 
the technological or social structures that they think cause, or are 
responsible for, the problem of concern. Thus, in the second stage of 
concern, environmentalists attempt to have the subject matter of their 
concern recognized at a political level by the action representatives of 
society. To do this they use of a number of oppositional methods, for 
example, protests, boycotts, non-violent resistance, education 
campaigns, and so on. Environmentalists aim to involve others with 
their concern by having the structures they have identified as implicated 
respond to their claims. The responses centre on what are usually called 
“the facts,” and as such, the oppositional method and subsequent 
responses map out a definition of the problem.  
As contested facts of existence, two subjects define these sites of 
resistance. There is both something with intrinsic value, and something 
reacting against the way the whistle-blowing environmentalist believes 
the facts to be. Peirce called this grade of clearness “the category of 
struggle.”12 
Dualistic distinctions permeate the second stage of concern, and, as a 
consequence, environmentalists at this level tend to frame their concern 
with either/or arguments. Such arguments are usually constructed via a 
rhetorical strategy in which, of two polar choices, one leads to an 
irreparable environmental loss, the other to a major environmental 
victory.13 We might also note, then, that at this second stage of 
environmental concern, the feelings of the environmentalists are 
typically seen to be the subjective side of the opposition, while the 
stronger party appears to occupy the objective side of the conflict.14 The 
oppositional dualism is based on a power relation, and therefore 
solutions at this level of concern tend to stimulate further protests or 
remedial “fixes,” creating a pattern of displacements in which each 
subsequent act of opposition simultaneously creates its own locus of 
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resistance, transforming every subsequent victory, or loss, into yet 
another displacement of the original concern. The environmental 
concern becomes centred upon who wins and who loses, rather than 
how we should act on the basis of our ideas in future.  
In this stage of environmental concern, then, the feelings identified in 
the whistle-blowing stage are taken to be existentially first, while the 
identified causes of the concern are argued to be existentially second. 
What is first is about to be lost, never to be restored, thus the 
environmental slogan, “Act now before it’s too late!” Put in terms of 
Peirce’s categories, we say that the first grade of concern (feeling) is 
logically presupposed in the second stage of concern (struggle). 
As Fisher notes, arguments based in the second stage of environmental 
concern therefore usually only succeed in a very limited sense.15 The 
environmentalists may protest their concerns successfully, perhaps 
winning battle after battle, but these victories only serve to displace the 
concern from one physical, temporal, social, or ideological context to 
another. Thus, while whistle-blowing and protesting may succeed in 
drawing attention to, and defining the problem in structural and/or 
political terms, we find that the concern is structured in 
communicational terms as an environmental debate. The objective of a 
debate is to defeat an opponent rather than mediate a solution that 
genuinely satisfies both sides reciprocally in a collaborative manner. 
Put another way, the purpose of a debate is to make known (i.e., to 
legitimate) a particular view of nature by means of persuasive 
techniques that do not require a direct dialogue or mediated contact 
with nature.  
Politics is not corrupted by the above style of sophistical 
communication; rather, it is constituted by it. In other words, the ideal 
of deep questioning (i.e., finding out the truth) is abandoned in favour 
of other ideals, often without any recognition that this has happened. A 
concern for the subject matter (the environment) can easily be lost sight 
of at this stage.  
3 Social action as deep enquiry 
In Fisher’s third stage of environmental concern, a mediate realm of 
thoughtful action emerges. In Peirce’s terms, rather than focus on what 
has been made clear, we examine what ought to be the meaning of the 
concern if its true usefulness is to be fulfilled. In other words, we 
evaluate the idea that represents our concern by testing it in the real 
world. Thus, the third stage of environmental concern incorporates the 
feelings of the first stage, the dualistic struggles of the second stage, 
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and a level of concern not covered by feelings or struggle. Peirce16 
called this third grade of concern “thought,” but for reasons that will 
soon become apparent, I will call this third grade “deep enquiry.” 
In the integrated framework I am sketching here, each stage or grade of 
environmental concern presupposes the previous stage or grade. Thus, 
at the third level of concern, environmentalists unite two distinct styles 
of communicative action within a third mediating system of critical 
awareness. Any disparity between the concern identified at the whistle-
blowing stage, and the concern defined by the dual forces of existence 
identified at the stage of struggle, is a motivation for further enquiry. 
Thus, it is through enquiring into the issue as a community of concern 
that something independent of our social expectations (i.e., the intrinsic 
value of nature) can be brought into a meaningful relation with our 
established ways of interacting with nature, and experimented with to 
obtain a truly co-operative relation. In other words, in the third stage of 
environmental concern, we take the general principles operative in 
nature seriously enough to consider the consequences of taking action 
on the basis of our reasoning about them.17 
The distinguishing feature of deep enquiry, then, is that it is 
experimental. If we act on the basis of our thinking, we are connecting 
our feelings to the struggles of existence, and acting “with-in” thought. 
Thought, then, is never a thing in itself: it represents something else to 
us, for some purpose.  
To illustrate how this might work, let us consider the environmental 
issue raised by the possibility that legal standing can be granted to 
environmental objects, such as trees.18 To enquire into this issue 
involves not only conceding that trees “speak,” but also that their 
speech can be heard by a human.19 This move would represent the first 
grade of concern. Next, a group of people embody this feeling and 
protest the concerns of trees in the forests. In this second stage of 
concern, someone, let us say a logging company and its associated 
political allies, takes an oppositional view, and in doing so regards the 
voices of trees (as represented in the bodies of the protesters) as 
something to be silenced. In doing this, the oppositional forces in fact 
uphold the “unthinkable,” that is, they take action to suppress the rights 
of something categorized as “rightless.” This reaction therefore 
constructs a definition of what is commonly called “an environmental 
problem.” In the second stage of concern, then, politicizing what was 
considered unthinkable is made doable. Those involved can save 
themselves from the dilemma this creates (conservation or 
development) by denying that any connection between peoples’ 
feelings and trees exists, or, alternatively (and here we enter the third 
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level of concern), the wider community can concede the possibility that 
trees have rights, and consider this as a provisional conclusion. Several 
alternative paths of action then lie open to choice, and the community is 
now free to enquire into the possible future consequences of taking the 
voice of trees seriously. 
Built into the third level of concern, then, is a possible future 
relationship between people and nature. Nature, when seen as 
“property” in this sense, is a concept involving the negotiation of 
power, and this is why we can, if we want to, legitimately specify 
concepts that create a relationship between humans and nature, such as 
“privilege,” “obligation,” or “responsibility.”20 In contrast, ideas such 
as “wealth,” “asset,” or “resource” are characteristic of second-stage 
thinking: there is no common obligation implied, only extensions of the 
concept of personal ownership. Similarly, direct perceptions of harm to 
the regularities of natural systems are characteristic of first-stage 
thinking, and as I have explained, these are not taken seriously until 
given existence by the second-stage of concern. 
Conclusion 
To review briefly, in the first stage of environmental concern the 
greatest emphasis is placed on the feelings associated with an issue of 
concern. In the second stage, the feelings of concern are given existence 
in the mode of dualistic struggles, often expressed in terms such as “the 
conflict between nature and development.” In the third stage of 
environmental concern, experimental reasoning becomes predominant. 
At this level of concern, environmentalists work to foster a co-operative 
community in which we investigate or enquire deeply into the 
consequence of our ideas. 
Having examined Fisher’s three stages of environmental concern, we 
have also found them to coincide satisfactorily with Peirce’s three 
grades of clarity: the monadic grade of feeling, the dyadic grade of 
struggle, and the plural grade of thought.21 I undertook this task to show 
why Peirce and Fisher’s process distinctions might have relevance for 
environmental activists, especially environmental activists who 
subscribe to the platform of deep ecology. The analogy I have 
demonstrated shows how a community-based approach to 
environmental dislocation requires the blending of all three levels of 
concern into a triadic system of ongoing deep enquiry.  
Society needs to feel nature as if feeling nature were something that 
really matters. Society also needs its doubters and negators in order to 
embody the concerns we call “environmental problems,” that is, to give 
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our feelings of concern existence at a political or legal level. Most of 
all, however, both society and nature need environmentalists who can 
recognize that deep enquiry is a life-preserving instinct. As Peirce 
explained, evolution has provided us with a natural instinct to pursue 
the truth of things within a community committed to the pursuit of the 
same ideal.22 We might call this quest of quests science, or perhaps, if 
the reader prefers, thoughtful community action. Either way, it is only 
through the continuous process of deep enquiry that feelings and 
struggles can get tested and revised in the light of our experiences as a 
community—a community of enquirers living with-in nature. 
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